Publication Date: 3/1/78
    Pages: 121
    Date Entered: 2/23/84
    Title: STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (FOR COMMENT)
    March 1978
    U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    REGULATORY GUIDE
    OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
    REGULATORY GUIDE 5.55
    STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS
    CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES
    INTRODUCTION
    The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), directed the NRC, among other
    things, to develop contingency plans ". . . for dealing with threats,
    thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level
    radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities
    licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. . . ."
    The principal requirements for the development of safeguards
    contingency plans for licensed fuel cycle facilities are found in 10 CFR
    Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities"; Part 70,
    "Special Nuclear Materials"; and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants
    and Materials." Paragraphs 10 CFR 50.34(d) and 10 CFR 70.22(j) identify
    the requirements for a safeguards contingency plan. Appendix C of 10
    CFR Part 73 identifies the criteria to be followed in developing the
    contingency plan.
    A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides
    guidance to licensee personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish
    specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or
    sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An
    acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined
    set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an
    identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms
    necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a
    specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity
    responsible for each decision and action.
    A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1)
    Background, (2) a Generic Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base,
    (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures.
    The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan,
    describes the environment within which the plan will be put into effect,
    and defines the terms used.
    The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned
    for and the associated objective to be reached for each event. It may
    also include for each event an overview of the general types of
    decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the
    licensee in clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the
    objective.
    The Licensee Planning Base contains the planning information
    peculiar to a given licensee including his organizational entities for
    contingency response tasking, facility descriptions and locations
    necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control
    functions, etc.
    The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the
    assignment of specific decisions and actions that each organizational
    entity takes to effect such response.
    For each organizational entity, the decisions and actions, as
    assigned in the Responsibility Matrix, are finally summarized in a
    Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures Summaries that
    result are simplified presentations of the assigned responsibilities for
    use in training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary,
    although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to
    the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5).
    This regulatory guide prescribes the proposed standard format for
    the safeguards contingency plan. It also contains an example
    contingency plan, included as a supplement, to illustrate the guide's
    application. This guide may be revised to reflect comments received and
    additional staff review.
    Purpose and Applicability
    This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid
    in ensuring completeness of planning and presentation and to simplify
    the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan. It applies to fuel
    cycle licensees who are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Section
    73.50 and Section 73.60 (proposed 10 CFR Section 73.45 and Section
    73.46, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977).
    This document describes the information required for a plan.
    Information submitted will be reviewed for completeness on the basis of
    unique site considerations and the contents of this guide. If an
    application does not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the
    required information, final review will be delayed until the needed
    information is provided. It is anticipated that the safeguards
    contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to the physical
    security plan. To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan
    are treated in adequate detail in a licensee's approved physical
    security plan, they may be incorporated by cross reference to the
    security plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional
    information as appropriate. It is also the responsibility of the
    applicant or licensee to be aware of new and revised NRC regulations.
    Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in
    Division 5, "Materials and Plant Protection," and technical reports and
    appropriate to certain sections of the physical security plan submitted
    under Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Section 73.50 or
    Section 73.60 (proposed 10 CFR Section 73.45 and Section 73.46, see 42
    FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorporated by reference. The applicant
    should discuss his plans and programs with the NRC staff before
    preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the depth
    of information required for this plan.
    Use of the Standard Format
    The standard format and content is described in succeeding
    chapters and is illustrated in the example plan presented in the
    supplement.
    If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt the standard format
    and content, he should follow the numbering system of this document at
    least down to the level of subsection (i.e., 3.4.1). Certain
    subsections may be omitted from an application if they are clearly
    unnecessary for providing a complete plan or if they are needlessly
    repetitive. In such cases appropriate adaptation of the standard format
    to accommodate the particular circumstances is permissible.
    The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his
    contingency plan information that is not required by regulations and is
    not essential to the description of the physical protection program.
    Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted
    in demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives
    considered, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or
    calculations. This type of information should be clearly labeled and
    provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be
    considered as a license condition.
    Style and Composition
    The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise
    presentation of information that portrays the general perspective and
    concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific aspects of the plan
    may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the
    presentation in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and
    maintenance of the information.
    Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent
    should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent
    throughout the submittal and should be consistent with generally
    accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document.
    Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may
    be presented more adequately or conveniently by such means. In general,
    these illustrations should be located in the section where they are
    first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information
    presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that
    drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by
    unaided normal eyes.
    A table of contents should be included in each submittal.
    Physical Specifications of Submittals
    All materials submitted in a safeguards contingency plan should
    conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of
    paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.:
1. Page Size
    Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches.
    Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred;
    however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished
    copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches.
2. Paper Stock and Ink
    Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density
    for handling and for microfilming.
3. Page Margins
    A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on
    the top, bottom, and binding side of all pages submitted.
4. Printing
    Composition: text pages should be single spaced.
    Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming.
    Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically
    reproduced. Pages may be printed on both sides with the
    images printed head to head.
5. Binding
    Pages should be punched for looseleaf standard 3-hole
    binder.
6. Page Numbering
    Pages should be numbered sequentially.
7. Format References
    In the application, references to this Standard Format
    should be by chapter and section numbers.
    Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages
    The updating or revising of data and text should be on a
    replacement page basis.
    The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted
    by a vertical line. The line should be on the margin opposite the
    binding margin for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to
    update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change.
    The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to
    be inserted and the pages to be removed. When changes or additions that
    affect the table of contents are made, pages for a revised table of
    contents should be provided.
    Number of Copies
    The applicant or licensee should (1) submit 6 copies to the
    Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, or (2) file them in
    person at the Commission's office at 1717 H Street NW., Washington,
    D.C., or at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland.
    Public Disclosure
    The NRC has established that safeguards contingency plans contain
    information of a type specified in 10 CFR Section 2.790(d) and shall be
    subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR
    Section 9.12.
    Compatibility
    The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan
    is compatible with the other sections of his application. Reference to
    sections in the physical security plan may be made in response to
    information requested by this guide.
    1. BACKGROUND
    1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER
    Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of
    licensee personnel and licensee property posed by the possibility of
    attempts to commit industrial sabotage or to steal strategic special
    nuclear material. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards
    contingency planning stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for
    current safeguards system design or upgrading. The statement contained
    in 10 CFR Section 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will
    suffice. The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan
    for ready reference and clarity with regard to the adversary
    capabilities that are assumed to oppose the performance of the primary
    security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee should examine
    his operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the threats
    postulated by the Commission. This examination is to make the applicant
    or licensee more aware of the total scope of response and will
    facilitate the generation of events in the Generic Planning Base.
    1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN
    State the general aims and and purposes underlying the
    implementation of the plan, e.g., general uses intended for the plan,
    the particular plant site covered, etc.
    1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN
    Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following
    information:
    The general types of contingencies that have been considered,
    i.e., theft, sabotage, threats.
    The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response
    to an adversary action and the general operational concepts or approach
    to performing the mission. The mission statement simply reveals what is
    to be accomplished and when and why. The operational concept presents
    an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity
    of intent, the operational concept may indicate explicitly the
    conditions under which the plan might be executed, e.g., night, day, all
    weather, natural disasters, fires, site evacuations, etc.
    Where annotated diagrams or maps of the plant site layout and
    surrounding areas will be helpful for quickly identifying reference
    locations, rallying points, movement routes, designated security
    sectors, etc., they may be included here or referred to if included
    elsewhere in the plan.
    1.4 DEFINITIONS
    Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions
    used in describing the operational and technical aspects of the plan.
    2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE
    Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of
    a safeguards contingency according to how they are first perceived by
    the licensee's personnel. A sufficient number of events should be
    identified to cover the range of possible safeguards contingencies that
    are envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested to
    limit the number that are required for the plan. Refer to Appendix C of
    the supplement for examples illustrating the manner of specifying these
    events.
    For each event identified, specify the objective to be
    accomplished by the operational elements when they respond to that
    particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration should be
    given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail
    as of the time the subject events occur. For example, if information
    available at the time is likely to be so vague that the operational
    elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is in
    progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve
    determining what the actual situation is. Attainment of this objective
    would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the next event and
    objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to
    accomplish the primary security mission reflected in Section 1.3.
    In addition to the required information above, other information
    may be included in the generic planning base that is helpful to the
    licensee (or applicant) in preparing or clearly presenting the general
    nature of the planned responses to achieve the selected objectives. For
    example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach
    that will be taken by the overall response organization to accomplish a
    given objective may be helpful in planning, assigning, and subsequent
    training of personnel in the specific response actions developed in the
    Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be
    tantamount to presenting a limited operational concept that is
    specifically applicable to the attainment of the particular objective.
    Another type of information that may be helpful for ready reference is
    an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the
    generic events and objectives utilized for planning. A version of this
    type of information is shown in Appendix C of the example plan contained
    in the supplement.
    3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE
    In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the
    licensee's organization, infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law
    enforcement assistance, and other considerations that bear upon the
    execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current
    capabilities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan
    execution in the event of a contingency during the current period. If
    applicable, reference may be made to parts of the physical security plan
    where pertinent information is adequately presented, rather than
    repeating the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan.
    Types of information that should be considered for inclusion in the plan
    are further described below. Use additional paragraphs as necessary to
    present other pertinent information.
    3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
    Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of
    planning, assigning, and conducting coordinated safeguards contingency
    response actions to attain the specified objectives presented in the
    Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the
    personnel composing the various operational entities that appear in the
    Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities
    tasked in the plan that implement detailed contingency response actions.
    The minimum composition of each operational entity over a 24-hour
    manning period should be indicated, as well as any special equipment
    that would be available with the entity. The designated leader and
    alternate leader of an operational entity may be identified implicitly
    by first and second placement on the respective listing or by explicit
    identification within the listing. Procedures for alerting and
    marshalling off-duty personnel, as applicable, should also be presented.
    3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT
    Operations maps (or appropriate diagrams) showing the layout of
    the plant and site features and the surrounding local geographic areas
    may be included here or elsewhere in the plan (e.g., Section 1.3 in
    connection with the operational concept). If included elsewhere, merely
    refer to the particular location in this paragraph. The purpose of this
    type of information is to provide the response forces with an easily
    referenced graphical display of positional information that will serve
    as a common reference for rapidly coordinating response operations
    during execution. In that regard, planned locations (such as
    alternative rallying points, control and coordination points, law
    enforcement agency (LEA) locations, movement routes, road block
    locations, etc.) may be identified by annotated coding on the map. This
    will facilitate fast and accurate communication of the actual situation
    and thereby assist coordinating and adjusting response operations as
    appropriate to the actual situation.
    3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE
    Identify each separate law enforcement agency with which
    arrangements have been made for safegurds emergency assistance. For
    each agency, state the modes and points of contact, describe the
    notification procedure, state the expected response in terms of manpower
    as a function of time, and state the equipment that responding personnel
    will possess. Describe the general marshalling procedures and channels
    established for coordination with arriving LEA onsite and while enroute.
    In addition, describe any additional special capabilities that will be
    available such as helicopters, offsite roadblocks, hot pursuit
    arrangements, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, hostage
    negotiation expertise, bomb disposal expertise, and LEA communications
    facilities that will be used to coordinate response activities.
    Indicate the principal law enforcement official or agency for requesting
    and coordinating additional LEA response as required.
    As applicable, provide similar information on the interface and
    assistance of bomb disposal units with which direct arrangements have
    been made.
    3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
    Identify laws and company policies that will substantially
    constrain or otherwise influence execution of response actions during
    contingency situations. This may include, but need not be limited to,
    the following areas as applicable:
    a. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement
    will be depended on to protect plant properties and employees against
    adversary intrusion and theft incidents.
    b. Extent to which company employees will be allowed to perform
    hazardous physical security duties to accomplish safeguards contingency
    response actions.
    c. Extent to which off-duty employees and employee property may
    be counted upon in response to security contigencies.
    d. Whether licensee personnel or local LEA are in charge of
    coordinating overall joint onsite response.
    e. Role of licensee personnel in local offsite LEA operations.
    3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
    Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the
    use and operation of the various means of communication (licensee and
    LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency response operations is
    included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned operating
    procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various operational
    entities involved.
    The information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who
    controls what and when. Also, as applicable, the manner of passing
    control from one point of leadership to another during progress of a
    contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational
    entity is presumed to be in control of that entity unless otherwise
    specified. Primary and alternate locations of key control points and
    individuals and the manner of announcing the use of an alternate
    location rather than the primary one are appropriate items to be
    addressed.
    With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage
    of the various means of communications should be specific along with any
    special instructions that apply regarding operation of the equipment.
    As applicable, the specification and use of various codes or various
    features of the alarm system for rapid communication of situational
    information also are appropriate items for this section.
    3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS
    Information of operational significance to the utilization of
    safeguards systems equipment may be included here or elsewhere in the
    plan, as desired for clarity. For example, the location of available
    special weapons and protective equipment might be indicated here or in
    the section on administrative and logistical considerations. Also,
    information concerning communications equipment might be more
    appropriately included in the control and communications section than
    here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is
    necessary to coordinate commitment or use of the equipment during
    contingency response operations, e.g., its location if not installed,
    who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, the readiness state
    maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration,
    technical performance characteristics, and installed locations may be
    included by reference to appropriate parts of the physical security plan
    if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity. If no
    information is included in this section, the simple statement, "This
    section not used," should be inserted.
    3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
    Describe any special arrangements and practices that are
    maintained or implemented to ensure adequate administrative and
    logistical support during response to safeguards contingency events.
    The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all
    equipment and expendable supplies needed to effect a successful response
    to a safeguards contigency will be easily accessible, in good working
    order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be focused
    on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition,
    special weapons, gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could
    substantially affect the effectiveness of response personnel.
    Include also the planned arrangements for provision of necessary
    emergency services during safeguards contingency operations, such as
    medical evacuation and treatment of casualties and health physics. In
    that regard, existing emergency plans and preparations for provision of
    such services may be applicable, provided they are not dependent upon
    the availability of personnel who are important or essential to the
    safeguards contingency response actions.
    4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX
    Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic
    Planning Base. The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix should
    provide an overall picture of the response actions and their
    interrelationships.
    The Responsibility Matrix, illustrated below, is an array format
    to facilitate systematic presentation and crosscheck of the contingency
    response actions planned for each operational element. The three
    dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and
    "Decisions Actions."
    Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events
    selected in the Generic Planning Base (Chapter 2). The
    Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions and
    actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element
    (Sections 3.1 and 3.3) so as to gain the objective associated with that
    Event in the Generic Planning Base.
    One or more pages may be used to present the contingency actions
    associated with each event, depending upon the number of operational
    elements involved in the plan and the amount of column width allocated
    for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the
    representative fuel cycle safeguards contingency plan contained in the
    Supplement has spaces for 10 different operational elements on two pages
    of presentation for each contigency event; however, more or less may be
    used as necessary.
    It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the
    Supplement also shows the objective associated with each contingency
    event in two places: the first column and at the top in one other
    column. This presentation is for ease of reference. The first column
    permits quick reference during development and maintenance of the plan,
    and the other column serves to identify the particular operational
    element which decides when that objective has been attained.
    Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in a manner that
    precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the
    execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.
    5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY
    Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that
    summarizes the actions from the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to
    that operational element. The set of Procedures Summaries that results
    is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective
    implementation of the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of
    the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for
    approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the licensee's facility
    and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to
    ensure compliance with the Responsibility Matrix.
    Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise
    statements of the general responsibilities of the operational element
    during any safeguards contingency and of the specific actions assigned
    with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan. In
    that regard show where a task begins and follow its progress through
    each operational element until the task is completed; i.e., show the
    actions that each of the operational elements accomplishes to carry out
    the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility Matrix, a
    given set of summary statements may be used to cover more than one event
    when the events involved require the same or effectively the same type
    of actions. Also, where a given action is found to be common procedure
    for a number of operational elements, regardless of the specific
    contingency, that action may be included in a summary grouping of
    standard operating procedures for presentation in each of the Procedures
    Summaries. Statements of standard operating procedures may also reflect
    information of general interest to all operational entities, for
    example, the assignment of overall control responsibilities.
    Choice of the language used to prepare the Procedures Summaries
    should take into account on-the-job terminology.
    To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key
    portions of the Procedures Summary to checklist formats according to
    stages of increased preparedness to respond. For example, events deemed
    to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some
    predetermined alert code, e.g., yellow alert for conditions that are not
    perceived as imminent but that do require an enhanced state of readiness
    (some expressed threats, non-threatening civil demonstrations,
    unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and
    deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is
    increased to an appropriate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In
    effect, the events are grouped in alert categories by their sensitivity
    and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status,
    checklists are used by each operational element as reminders to perform
    specifically assigned duties.
    1. BACKGROUND
    1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER
    For planning purposes, it is assumed that an adversary incursion
    against REP Plant could occur at anytime, with little or no prior
    warning, to steal SNM or to commit industrial sabotage or to seize and
    hold areas of the plant until stated demands are met. Also, as a hoax
    or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal
    SNM from or to sabotage the plant.
    Potential adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated external
    persons without employee access to REP Plant protected areas or
    knowledgeable internal persons with the normal REP Plant employee
    credentials. An external adversary may include one to a small group of
    armed or unarmed individuals. If the adversary is armed, it is assumed
    the weapons types could vary from hand guns to shotguns to mixtures of
    weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives. Tactics employed could
    vary from those commonly used by criminal elements in armed robberies or
    extortions to infantry squad-level tactics involving coordinated team
    movements and use of weapons, as might be employed by well-trained
    terrorists. External adversaries might also be assisted by an unarmed
    internal adversary acting in collusion.
    Internal adversaries are assumed to include unarmed individuals
    who may be acting in collusion. One of the individuals may have daily
    authorized access to VAs or the MAA. Attempts at diversion or sabotage
    may be covertly executed over a period of time. However, one-time
    attempts might also be undertaken, possibly in conspiracy with an
    external adversary. Acts of guile and subterfuge may be expected to
    cover the internal adversary's actions. In general, nonviolent methods
    may be employed, but unarmed assault upon REP Plant employees might also
    occur in furtherance of the adversary's mission.
    1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN
    This document presents the safeguards contingency plan of a
    Representative Plant located on Alpha Site. The plan was prepared to
    guide and coordinate response actions by employees at Alpha Site against
    perceived or actual threats or attempts to (1) steal special nuclear
    material from the Representative Plant or (2) sabotage the plant's
    facilities.
    1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN
    1.3.1Types of Contingencies and Responses Considered
    Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats
    and attempts of theft of SNM and industrial sabotage are covered in the
    plan. The plan also includes mechanisms for initiating emergency plans
    to deal with radiological releases resulting from successful sabotage
    attempts, but it does not include the emergency plan operations
    themselves.
    1.3.2Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion
    The primary security mission at REP Plants is to protect the plant
    facilities at all times, to prevent the theft or diversion of SNM, and
    to prevent the sabotage of plant equipment.
    This mission is performed on a day-to-day basis by the security
    organization and facilities such as the access and egress control system
    operating in conjunction with the physical barriers and alarm systems
    that cover the protected area, the VAs, and the MAA.
    To deal decisively with an adversary incursion against an REP
    Plant and thereby accomplish the mission under these extraordinary
    circumstances, the LLEA emergency response force will be requested
    immediately upon verification of such an incursion. While the LLEA
    response is developing, the Alpha Site security force will respond to
    ascertain and assess the adversary situation and, depending upon the
    perceived strength and nature of the incursion, to detain, neutralize,
    or delay the adversary until the LLEA arrives.
    The Alpha Site security force will endeavor to fulfill the above
    role by intercepting an external adversary prior to penetration into
    Buildings 8, 10, or 7 (Figure 1). In the event the external adversary
    penetrates any of these buildings, and in cases of internal adversaries,
    the security force will attempt to intercept the adversary within the
    building or upon exit from the building, again depending upon the
    adversary's nature and strength. Concurrent with these actions, the
    security force will maintain a flow of situational information among
    themselves and REP Plant management to coordinate the onsite response
    actions, and to the LLEA response force to facilitate their
    effectiveness upon arrival.
    As the situation develops, REP Plant security employees will
    assist in delaying the adversary whenever possible without jeopardizing
    their personal safety. In this regard, they will lock doors as
    necessary to secure the MAA and VA, deny information to the adversary,
    and report adversary and situational circumstances to REP Plant MGMT to
    assist in illuminating the situation.
    1.4 DEFINITIONS
    Terms and expressions appearing throughout the plan are
    alphabetically listed and defined below for ease of reference:
    Term Definition
    (A) Notation that indicates an action is always
    taken; the action may be a hedge against
    uncertainty or necessary in light of the
    situation.
    (C) Notation that indicates an action may or may not
    be taken depending upon obvious circumstances of
    the situation.
    CAS Central Alarm Station, Building 10, at
    Representative Plant.
    FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation.
    LEA Law Enforcement Agency.
    (Due to database constraints, Figure 1 is not included. Please contact
    LIS to obtain a copy.)LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency.
    Local Police Net A mutual assistance police radio net operated by
    LLEA in the general vicinity of Alpha Site;
    Alpha Site guard force can enter/monitor this
    net.
    MAA Material Access Area.
    MCA Material Control and Accounting System.
    NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region ___,
    Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
    Off-Dy Guards Guards of the two normally off-duty shifts of
    the guard force at any given time.
    REP Plant Representative Plant at Alpha Site.
    REP Plant ADMIN Representative Plant employee group in the
    Administrative Area of Building 8, Alpha Site.
    REP Plant Bldg. 7 Representative Plant employees in Building 7
    area, Alpha Site.
    REP Plant MAA Representative Plant employees in the Material
    Access Area of Building 8, Alpha Site.
    REP Plant MGMT Senior onsite manager, REP Plant, with
    designated staff assistants at any given time.
    RESPN Team Alpha Site guards and volunteer employees who
    constitute an armed security response team to
    assist in safeguard of REP Plant facilities and
    materials in an emergency.
    SAS Secondary Alarm Station in Alpha Site Security
    Office, Building 4.
    Site MGMT The Alpha Site manager with designated staff
    assistants at any given time.
    SNM Special Nuclear Material.
    Site Radio Comm Net An operational radio net operated at Alpha Site
    by the site guard force.
    VA Vital Area.
    2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE
    Alpha Site Operational Elements indicated in Section 3.1 will
    respond as a team to events that either suggest or reveal an adversary
    incursion against REP Plant. The types of events experienced and the
    clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the
    incursion, the state to which the situation has progressed, and the
    amount of interaction that has occurred between the adversary and the
    operational elements. Therefore, the total response over time is a
    dynamic process conditioned by the circumstances of the situation as it
    progresses from start to finish.
    For planning purposes, a set of 24 events has been selected to
    cover the range of events that will trigger contingency response
    actions. For each of these events, an objective has been selected that
    specifies the main purpose to be accomplished by the operational
    elements in response to the particular event. In general there are two
    types of decision/action sequences reflected in these objectives: (1)
    assessment decision/action sequences to determine the situation and (2)
    preventive decision/action sequences against perceived attempts to steal
    or sabotage.
    Appendix C summarizes the events and the corresponding objectives
    and codes each combination for ease of reference.
    3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE
    3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
    The following operational elements are the organizational entities
    at Alpha Site adopted for purposes of assigning and executing security
    response tasks and procedures identified in this plan. Detailed
    composition of the operational elements is indicated in Appendix A.
    Functional Category Operational Elements
    Security Forces 1. CAS
2. SAS
3. RESPN Team
4. Off-Dy Guards
    Management 5. Site MGMT
6. REP Plant MGMT
    REP Plant Operations 7. REP Plant ADMIN
8. REP Plant MAA
9. REP Plant Bldg 7
    3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT
    See Figure 1, Subsection 1.3.2.
    3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE ASSISTANCE
    The following police forces have agreed to respond to Alpha Site's
    request for emergency law enforcement assistance to deal with
    adversaries who commit unlawful acts against Alpha Site property and/or
    employees. Appendix B presents the police response capabilities and the
    procedure for requesting emergency assistance.
    Category Force
    LLEA Red Town Police (Primary Contact)
    White Town Police
    Blue Town Police
    County Iron County Police
    State Steel State Police
    In addition to the above area police, the local office of the FBI
    will provide FBI agents to investigate and deal with Federal crimes
    committed against REP Plant and to assist the area police as requested.
    3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
    The following company policy constraints and assumptions are
    reflected in this plan and will influence the conduct of operational
    activities during execution:
    a. REP Plant will depend upon local, county, state, and Federal
    law enforcement agencies to the maximum extent possible to protect Plant
    properties against adversary incursions and to recover stolen company
    property.
    b. The employment of firearms against adversary incursions by
    Alpha Site employees will be governed by Steel State law. In general,
    this law permits a private citizen to employ firearms in those
    circumstances where the citizen has a reasonable belief that it is
    necessary in self defense or in defense of others when there is an
    immediate threat of death or grievous bodily injury.
    c. Company operations to achieve contingency plan objectives
    will be conducted in a manner that avoids personal injury to company
    employees and other innocent bystanders.
    d. Needless destruction or damage to company property and to
    other private and public properties will be avoided.
    e. Excepting guards, no company employee can be directed to
    perform hazardous physical security duties to protect REP Plant;
    however, company employees who volunteer may perform such duties during
    emergency situations.
    f. No company employee is expected to contribute his own
    personal property or off-duty time to support active contingency plan
    operations.
    3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
    3.5.1Transition Control Procedure
    a. REP Plant MGMT will direct the overall response actions of
    REP Plant in coordination with the Alpha Site Security Supervisor, who
    will coordinate the overall response of the security force.
    b. Early security force response actions will be coordinated by
    the CAS if the response is directed to the REP Plant protected area.
    The SAS will coordinate the early response if it is directed to other
    Alpha Site locations.
    c. During the early response period, the Security Supervisor
    will coordinate with the CAS and SAS to assume overall control of the
    security force response as soon as practical during the situation
    development.
    d. Early offsite police response will be coordinated by Red
    Town Police. Initial contacts with Red Town Police will be by the CAS,
    or alternatively by RESPN Team or CAS in the event such is necessary
    because of communications problems with the CAS.
    e. Coordination with the local police response force onsite
    will be accomplished by way of the Security Supervisor and the Red Town
    Police. The Red Town Police will continue to coordinate the police
    response actions onsite.
    3.5.2Primary and Alternate Locations
    a. REP Plant MGMT
    Primary Locations: REP Plant Administrative Area
    Building 8
    Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 693
    Alternate Location: SAS, Site Security Office
    Building 4
    Telephone (400) 374-630)
    Ext. 211 or Ext. 316
    b. Alpha Site Security Supervisor
    Primary Location: SAS, Site Security Office
    Building 4
    Telephone (400) 374-6300
    Ext. 211 or Ext. 316
    Alternate Location: CAS
    Building 10
    Telephone (400) 374-6300
    Ext. 540
    c. Police Coordination Point on Alpha Site
    Primary Location: SAS, Site Security Office
    Building 4
    Telephone (400) 374-6300
    Ext. 211 or ext. 316
    Alternate Location: CAS
    Building 10
    Telephone (400) 374-6300
    Ext. 540
    d. Use of alternate locations in lieu of the primary locations
    will be reported to and coordinated with the security supervisor.
    3.5.3Site Radio Comm Net
    The Site Radio Comm Net comprises seven stations, six of which are
    portable. Call designations, initial location of equipment, number of
    channels, and uses of the stations are indicated below. Unit 100 at the
    CAS is the base station for net control. Appendix D outlines
    communications procedures.
    Station Initial Number of
    Designation Location Channels Uses
    Unit 100 CAS 2 Channel 1: Net Base Station
    (Nonportable) 2: Local Police Net
    Unit 200 CAS 2 Channel 1: Patrols and RESPN
    (Portable) Team
    2: Local Police Net
    Unit 300 CAS 2 Channel 1: Patrols and RESP
    (Portable) Team
    2: Local Police Net
    Unit 400 CAS 2 Channel 1: Utility and Backup
    (Portable) 2: Local Police Net
    Unit 500 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team
    (Portable) 2: Local Police Net
    Unit 600 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team
    (Portable) 2: Local Police Net
    Unit 700 SAS 2 Channel 1: SAS
    (Portable) 2: Local Police Net
    3.5.4Local Police Net
    There are nine stations as indicated below in the local police
    net, with the net control base station being operated at Blue Town. As
    indicated in paragraph 3.4.3 above, Channel 2 of the Site Radio Comm Net
    links with the local police net. Primary points of contact for the
    Alpha Site Security Force on entering the local police net using Channel
    2 are Red Town Base and Car #4. Appendix D outlines the procedure.
    Station Designation Use
    Blue Town Base Net Control Base Station and Blue Town
    Control
    Car #1 Blue Town Police Response
    Car #2 Blue Town Police Response
    Red Town Base Red Town Control
    Car #3 Red Town Police Response
    Car #4 Red Town Police Response
    White Town Base White Town Control
    Car #5 White Town Police Response
    Car #6 White Town Police Response
    3.5.5Silent Alarms and Intercoms
    a. Silent alarm from CAS to SAS will be used by CAS to
    initially request RESPN Team response; followup communications will be
    via normal telephone channels.
    b. Intercom within Building 8 will be used by REP Plant MGMT to
    alert and pass information to REP Plant ADMIN and REP Plant MAA
    elements. Normal telephone channels to Building 7 will be used in this
    regard REP Plant Building 7 elements.
    c. Intercom between CAS and Building 8 will be used for rapid
    communication of alert and other information in addition to normal
    telephone channels.
    3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE
    This paragraph not used.
    3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL PLANNING
    3.7.1Radio Batteries
    Portable radio batteries will be charged continuously when units
    are not in use. Spare replacement batteries will be available at the
    CAS and SAS.
    3.7.2Arms and Ammunition
    Extra ammunition for individual weapons will be available at the
    CAS and the SAS. Additionally, there are six 12-gauge shotguns with
    ammunition available, two at the CAS and four at the SAS.
    3.7.3Emergency Services
    The manager of health and safety services (Building 6, Telephone
    (400) 374-6300, Ext 740) will be prepared to furnish health physics,
    medical evacuation, firefighting, traffic control, and other emergency
    services in accordance with standard site emergency procedures. Site
    security forces will not be relied upon in effecting such preparations
    in order to ensure their availability for conducting safeguards
    contingency operations.
    4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX
    Within the context of the general responsibilities assigned to
    each operating element, the planning of detailed tasks to support the
    attainment of the contingency objectives (specified in the Generic
    Planning Base, Appendix C) has been accomplished through use of the
    Responsibility Matrix in Appendix E.
    5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY
    To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures
    Summary for each operating element is contained in Appendix F. These
    procedures present the general responsibilities of the operating
    elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of
    the contingency task sequences that are assigned to the elements in the
    Responsibility Matrix (Appendix E). In the event security contingencies
    that are not reflected in the contingency task sequences occur,
    operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with
    the general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated
    in the procedures summary so as to accomplish the primary security
    mission (Subsection 1.3.2).
    APPENDIX A
    ALPHA SITE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS
    Alpha Site Operational Elements are manned normally as indicated
    below over a 24-hour period. Guard personnel are assigned to shifts in
    rotation from the list of Enclosure 1.(*) Enclosure 1 also lists
    telephone numbers and addresses to expedite off-duty contacts.
    Enclosure 2 specifies the "chain-alert" procedure for alerting key
    personnel in the REP Plant security program who are off duty.
    ENCLOSURE 2
    APPENDIX A
    ALERT PROCEDURE, KEY OFF-DUTY PERSONNEL
1. PURPOSE
    The purpose of this alert procedure is to quickly and reliably
    pass alert information to key personnel of the REP Plant security
    program who are off duty. To accomplish this, alert codes and a chain
    sequence for communicating the codes will be employed.
2. ALERT CODES
    Code Meaning
    GREEN Return to normal state; no alert
    YELLOW Standby; be prepare to depart
    immediately for Alpha Site to
    assist in dealing with an emergency
    situation.
    ORANGE Assemble immediately at Alpha Site
    Security Office to assist in dealing
    with an emergency situation; arms
    are not required.
    RED Assemble immediately at Alpha Site
    to assist in dealing with an
    emergency situation; arms are
    required.
3. CHAIN-ALERT PROCEDURE
    To rapidly disseminate the above alert codes, alert groups are
    organized as indicated below. The SAS will trigger the alert procedure
    for off-duty personnel by contacting the top listed person in each of
    the off-duty groups, or alternatively the next lower person in the
    group, and communicate to him the appropriate alert message code, e.g.,
    "This is the SAS; ORANGE alert as of 10:30 p.m." The person contacted
    by the SAS in each group is responsible for communicating the alert to
    others of that group and for starting his response to the substance of
    the alert message within 5 minutes after his receipt of the alert.
    APPENDIX B
    LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
1. POLICE RESPONSE FORCES
    a. Onsite Response
    The following listed police capability is planned by the law
    enforcement agencies indicated for immediate response to emergency
    requests for police assistance at Alpha Site. The strength of the
    response will depend upon adversary strength and the circumstances of
    the particular situation.
    Force Strength Equipment
    Red Town Police 2 Officers within Each equipped with
    White Town Police 5 minutes pistol and shotgun, riot
    Blue Town Police 4 Officers within control and gas
    10 minutes equipment, radio, and
    police cruiser.
    Iron County Police 4 Officers within Equipped with pistols,
    15 minutes shotguns, and rifles, 2
    police cruisers with
    radios.
    Steel State Police 4 Officers within Equipped with pistols,
    30 minutes automatic rifles, 4
    police cruisers with
    radios.
    b. Area Response
    In addition to the above onsite response, county and State
    police are prepared to cordon off the immediate and general area of
    Alpha Site if warranted by the situation by establishing road blocks and
    traffic checkpoints as indicated on the enclosed(*) map. Times required
    from receipt of request until establishment of the respective operations
    are indicated below:
    Operation Time to Set Up Responsibility
    Road Blocks A,B,C 10 to 15 Minutes Iron County Police
    Road Block D Within 10 Minutes Iron County Police
    Traffic Check Points 20 to 30 Minutes Steel State Police
    1 through 7
    When the traffic checkpoint operations are executed, Steel
    State Police will place a police helicopter (BAT-4) in operation over
    the general area of Alpha Site to assist in communications and in chase
    operations that might ensue. County and State police cruisers will
    monitor Channel 3 for communications with BAT-4.
    c. FBI Response
    FBI agents from Purple City FBI Office will assist local,
    county, and State police operations where possible and will investigate
    infractions of Federal law against Alpha Site.
    ----------
    (*) Omitted in this example.
    ----------
    In general, special agents can be active at Alpha Site within 1 to 3
    hours after notification of the FBI. Special SWAT Team capabilities and
    negotiating skills are available with the FBI response if needed.
2. ALPHA SITE INTERFACE WITH POLICE
    a. Contact Points to Request Police Assistance
    Red Town Police is the principle point of contact for Alpha
    Site to obtain and coordinate with police response forces. Requests for
    police response can be made by telephone or by radio to the following
    points of contact:
    Telephone Red Town Chief of Police
    Telephone
    Radio (Site Alpha Channel 2) Red Town Base
    b. Information with Requests
    When police response is requested, the following information
    should be provided to the police to the extent that it is known in order
    that an appropriate response force can be assembled.
    - Approximate number of adversaries.
    - Adversary weapon types (i.e., unarmed or armed with
    pistols, shotguns, rifles, automatic weapons, etc.).
    - Adversary mood (i.e., peaceful, violent).
    - Adversary general activity (e.g., breaking into plant,
    demonstration, etc.).
    c. Police Force Assembly and Response
    Based on information furnished by Alpha Site, Red Town
    Police will request additional police response assistance as needed to
    deal with the situation on Alpha Site. Police response forces will
    assemble at Alpha Site without delay, obtain latest information on the
    situation, and then move to deal with the adversary. Red Town Police
    will coordinate police response actions onsite. Alpha Site Security
    Officer will serve as the principal point of contact for coordination
    between Alpha Site Operational Elements and the police response force.
    Requests for county and State police action to establish
    road blocks and traffic checkpoints will be made through Red Town police
    as indicated above. Information to facilitate identification of
    adversary, such as number and descriptions of persons and their
    transportation, license numbers, etc., should be provided with such
    requests.
    (Due to database constraints, Appendix C is not included. Please contact
    LIS to obtain a copy.)APPENDIX D
    COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
1. PURPOSE
    To outline procedures for use of radio equipment by the Alpha Site
    security force.
2. EQUIPMENT
    Radio equipment for the security force includes one stationary and
    6 portable transmitter-receiver units. Each unit can be operated on one
    of two possible channels by setting the frequency selector switch to the
    Channel 1 or Channel 2 position. Channel uses are as follows:
    Channel 1 - Site Radio Comm Net
    Channel 2 - Local Police Net
3. SITE RADIO COMM NET
    a. All units will operate normally in the Site Radio Comm Net -
    i.e., Channel 1 for coordination and direction of Alpha Site security
    force operations. Station designations and normal employment are as
    follows:
    Station Initial
    Designation Location Employment
    Unit 100 CAS Site Radio Comm Net Base Station
    (Nonportable)Unit 200 CAS Patrols or RESPN Team
    (Portable)Unit 300 CAS Patrols or RESPN Team
    (Portable)Unit 400 CAS Utility and Backup
    (Portable)Unit 500 SAS RESPN Team
    (Portable)Unit 600 SAS RESPN Team
    (Portable)Unit 700 SAS SAS
    (Portable) b. Communication Code Words: Meaning
    ROGER I have received your
    transmission OK.
    WILCO I have received your request,
    and I will comply with the
    request.
    OVER I have finished transmitting
    and am awaiting your reply.
    OUT I have finished transmitting
    this message, and the channel
    is now free for others to use.
    REPEAT Repeat your transmission. I
    did not receive it.
    REPEAT AFTER Repeat your transmission after
    the word ; I did not
    receive it.
    AFFIRMATIVE The answer to your question is
    yes.
    NEGATIVE The answer to your question is
    no.
    c. Net Call Sign: ALPHA 6
    The net call sign will be used whenever a unit terminates
    his transmission with "Out", thereby indicating that he has finished use
    of the Channel at that time, e.g.,
    "This is ALPHA-6 Unit 400; wilco; out."
    d. Base Station Control:
    Unit 100 at CAS is the Net Base Station and must be aware of
    every unit that is active in the net. Therefore, all units will report
    entry into and departure from the net to the base station, e.g.,
    Unit 300 reports entry:
    Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; entering net;
    over."
    Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out."
    Unit 300 reports departure:
    Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; am switching
    to Channel 2; over."
    Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out."
    e. Operating Constraints:
1. Units will not use the channel whenever it is being
    used by other units. Termination of a transmission with "over"
    indicates the channel is still in use and has not been released for
    others to use. Termination of a transmission with "out" indicates the
    channel has been released for others to use.
2. Units will minimize transmission time by shortening
    conversation exchanges and keeping message content as short as possible
    consistent with clarity in meaning.
4. LOCAL POLICE NET
    a. Site Radio Comm Net Units can enter the Local Police Net by
    switching to Channel 2 and reporting entry to Blue Town Base Station,
    e.g.,
    "Blue Town Base, this is ALPHA-6, Unit 600; entering Net;
    over."
    When Blue Town Base acknowledges the entry, the ALPHA-6 Unit
    is recognized as active in the net.
    b. The "ALPHA-6 Unit " designation will always be used to
    identify an Alpha Site unit that is operating in the Local Police Net.
    c. Local Police Net station designations and identities are as
    follows:
    Station Designation Identification
    Blue Town Base Net Control Station and Blue Town Police
    Control.
    Car #1 Blue Town Police Response
    Car #2
    Red Town Base Red Town Police Control
    Car #3 Red Town Police Response
    Car #4
    White Town Base White Town Police Control
    Car #5 White Town Police Response
    Car #6
    d. Site Radio Comm Net units will report departure from the
    Local Police Net to Blue Town Base.
5. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE
    a. CAS and SAS will perform a communication check with both
    channels of each unit that is not in use at least once per shift.
    b. Portable units will be charged continuously when the units
    are not in use.
    APPENDIX E
    RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX
    Due to database constraints, Appendix E is not included. Please contact
    LIS to obtain a copy.)Appendix F
    PROCEDURES SUMMARY
    This approach provides a ready reference to specific task
    sequences for each operating element of the contingency plan. This
    summary of procedures, responsibilities, and task sequences are given in
    the nine enclosures as listed below:
    Enclosure 1. Security Officer's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 2. CAS's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 3. SAS's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 4. RESPN Team's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 5. Off-Duty Guards; Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 6. Site Management's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 7. REP Plant MGMT's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 8. ADMIN, MAA BLDG 7 Personnel's Procedures Summary
    Enclosure 9. LEA's Procedure's Summary
    Enclosure 1
    Appendix F
    SECURITY OFFICER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Security
    Officer. The context and background perspective of these duties are
    presented in the basic plan.
2. SECURITY OFFICER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    a. Plans, directs, and coordinates the overall task
    organization, disposition, movements, and response operations of the
    site security force, i.e., the CAS, SAS, RESPN Team, and Off-Dy Guards.
    b. Coordinates with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGMT as necessary
    to enhance security operational readiness and to effectively execute
    security response operations.
    c. Requests LEA assistance and coordinates with LEA providing
    response assistance as necessary to effectively plan and execute
    security response operations.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site; threatening
    civil disturbances exist; etc.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists; or a
    perceived possibility of an internal theft attempt
    exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
4. SECURITY OFFICER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:
    * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,
    * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or
    because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations
    at the plant, or
    * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT
    or other authority,
    THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:
    a. Keep the REP Plant MGMT informed of the threat and all
    available information concerning the threat.
    b. Perform onsite investigative effort as indicated by the
    situation and make offsite queries as requested by REP Plant MGMT to
    assemble additional information on the threat situation.
    c. Dispatch RESPN Team observers to scene of civil disturbances
    or other suspicious activity allegedly threatening the plant to monitor
    and report information on the seriousness of the perceived threat.
    d. Advise and assist REP Plant MGMT in assessing the
    seriousness of the threat.
    e. If threat is perceived serious by REP Plant MGMT or is
    reported to be serious by other duly constituted authority, coordinate
    with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGMT to implement increased security
    readiness measures appropriate to the perceived threat, e.g.,
    * Increase on-duty guard strength, and issue necessary
    arms and communication equipment.
    * Increase number and frequency of security patrols and
    checks.
    * Alert LEA response forces as to the seriousness of the
    perceived threat.
    * Increase frequency of queries to pertinent LEA or
    other pertinent agencies for threat status and early
    warning information and for continued threat
    assessment.
    * Place Off-Duty Guards on standby alert.
    * Review alert procedures and emphasize operational
    tactics as applicable to the situation.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:
    * Receives a report from the CAS or SAS, or otherwise learns
    of a serious imminent or on-going attempt by an adversary to
    penetrate the plant, or
    * Learns that an on-going civil disturbance or other
    suspicious activity is believed to be a serious imminent
    threat to penetrate the plant,
    THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:
    a. Monitor, assemble, and assess information on the adversary
    situation and the site security force situation as necessary to adjust,
    coordinate, and direct the on-going security force response operations
    to stop or effectively delay the adversary.
    b. Ensure that LEA assistance is requested and that responding
    LEA are kept informed of the adversary and security force situation, and
    recommend avenues of approach to the LEA for their initial contact with
    the adversary.
    c. Ensure that Off-Duty Guards are alerted, marshalled, and
    deployed as appropriate to the situation.
    d. Establish a joint coordination point on site with the
    response LEA to enhance communication and to achieve close coordination
    of security force activity with the LEA response actions.
    e. Ensure that REP Plant MGMT is kept informed of the adversary
    and response force situations and recommend dispositions and activity
    for REP Plant personnel appropriate to the situation.
    f. If the plant is seized and held hostage,
    * Assist REP Plant MGMT, Site MGMT, and LEA (as
    indicated by the situation) to establish
    communications with the adversary for negotiations.
    * Recommend LEA dispositions and activity (e.g., road
    blocks, involvement of other LEA, chase helicopter
    capability) to prevent adversary escape with SNM and
    to isolate the plant area.
    * Dispose the security force to support LEA on site
    dispositions and activity and to observe and report on
    the adversary situation.
    * Recommend to the LEA and to REP Plant MGMT the FBI
    assistance that should be requested, e.g.,
    - Federal expertise in adversary negotiations,
    - SWAT team capability,
    - Federal investigative activity regarding
    adversary ID and background.
    g. If adversary penetrates and escapes from the plant,
    * Ensure that LEA response is immediately informed of
    the adversary escape situation, i.e.,
    - Egress route and last seen direction of
    movement,
    - Transport description and license number,
    - Number of persons involved and description(s),
    - Articles carried and their location in the
    transport.
    * Request LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit
    operations to apprehend the adversary for recovery of
    any SNM in his possession.
    * Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him (guard
    interviews, reports, etc.) in determining if SNM has
    been stolen or if radioactivity has been dispersed.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:
    * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to
    sabotage the plant, e.g.,
    - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal
    alarms annunciate,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant, or
    - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or
    other safeguards degrading incident occurs,
    THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:
    a. Coordinate with the CAS, SAS, and RESPN Team to determine
    the circumstances of the incident and the status and activity of the
    RESPN Team deployment if any.
    b. Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him in assessing
    the situation and to determine internal security implications and needs.
    c. Ensure that the RESPN Team and other security elements
    deployed (including Off-Duty Guards) are adequate to control the
    situation and to provide required security surveillance of the protected
    area, as indicated by the situation.
    d. Monitor the situation; report to REP Plant MGMT the
    circumstances of attempted hiding or removal of items from the protected
    area or of suspicious attempts to exist from the protected area.
    e. Ensure that LEA assistance, as determined in consultation
    with REP Plant MGMT, is requested to deal with perceived adversaries or
    other persons involved in the situation.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THE SECURITY OFFICER:
    * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that
    a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have
    occurred, e.g.,
    - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,
    - Damaged plant doors or windows,
    * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive
    contamination external to plant,
    THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:
    a. Assemble information on the location and nature of plant
    damage and assess the security requirements stemming from such damage.
    b. Coordinate as required to keep REP Plant MGMT informed of
    the plant damage and security requirements and to determine the location
    and extent of existing radiological hazards and restrictions.
    c. Organize and dispose the security force as necessary to
    restore or cover degraded plant security protective features and to
    assist in isolating areas of radiological hazard.
    d. Keep security force informed of existing radiological
    hazards and restrictions.
    e. Recommend to REP Plant MGMT temporary repairs and the
    priority of permanent repairs to restore the effectiveness of damaged
    plant security protective features.
    Enclosure 2
    Appendix F
    CAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the CAS. The
    context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the
    basic plan.
2. CAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    CAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in
    coordination with SAS and REP Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site
    Security Officer informed of CAS actions as appropriate to the
    situation.
    a. Summon and direct RESPN Team immediately upon sensing the
    possibility of an adversary incursion in order to assess and deal with
    the situation.
    b. Summon police response force to deal with the adversary
    immediately upon becoming aware of an actual incursion.
    c. Block unauthorized passage via Building 10 to prevent escape
    with SNM.
    d. Prevent adversary penetration of Building 10 to protect the
    surveillance, communications, and alarm systems.
    e. Monitor the alarm system, the intercom, the CCTV, and the
    radio nets to be continually appraised of the situation and to acquire
    and report information on the adversary and the adversary situation.
    f. Report to SAS and REP Plant MGMT observed damage or breaches
    of plant physical security and recommend actions to provide interim
    security as needed.
    g. Acquire information on radiological hazard areas, as
    applicable, from the Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT and keep guard
    force informed as to the location of such areas.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, descriptions, dispositions, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists,
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening
    civil disturbances, etc.,
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists,
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
4. CAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:
    * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,
    * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or
    because of observed anomalies or other suspicious
    situations,
    * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT
    or other authority,
    THE CAS WILL:
    a. Report all information about the perceived threat without
    delay to the Security Officer (SAS).
    b. Perform additional security surveillance at CAS as directed
    by the Security Officer (SAS).
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:
    * Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration such
    as:
    - Annunciation of an intrusion alarm,
    - Extraneous noises occurring in the exclusion area,
    - Suspicious acts observed in or near the exclusion
    area, or
    - Security Officer (SAS) or RESPN Team warning of a
    dangerous onsite situation,
    THE CAS WILL:
    a. Check false alarm possibilities with the CCTV.
    b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the
    RESPN Team by actuating the "silent" alarm.
    c. Direct the RESPN Team to the plant security sector of
    concern; monitor the situation and receive RESPN Team reports over the
    Site Radio Comm Net.
    d. Assess the situation to determine if danger of plant
    penetration exists.
    e. If danger does exist, protect the CAS against adversary
    penetration.
    f. Warn REP Plant MGMT of danger over the intercom system.
    g. Enter Local Police Net; report situation (adversary
    strength, weapons, mood, and activity); request police response force
    assistance.
    h. Monitor adversary situation and police response force
    developments over the site and police nets; keep Security Officer (SAS)
    and REP Plant MGMT informed.
    i. If plant is penetrated, monitor intercom and the plant alarm
    systems to acquire and report information on adversary activity within
    the plant.
    j. If adversary escapes from plant, request the police to
    establish offsite road blocks and check points and to execute chase
    plans as warranted by situation.
    k. Report observations of adversary escape to the Security
    Officer, including:
    - Egress route and last seen direction.
    - Transport description and license number.
    - Number of persons involved and descriptions.
    - Description of articles carried by adversary on
    departure.
    - Location of adversary and cargo in the transport.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:
    * Receives an indication of a possible internal attempt to
    steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, such as:
    - An internal alarm or an emergency door alarm of the
    MAA or a VA annunciates,
    - The SNM or metal detector at entrance to the MAA
    annunciates,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant, or
    - An unexpected power or communication outage occurs,
    THE CAS WILL:
    a. Check false alarm possibilities, as applicable, via
    telephone or intercom to plant.
    b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the
    RESPN Team by actuating the "silent" alarm.
    c. Prevent unauthorized passage of SNM from the plant via
    Building 10.
    d. Direct RESPN Team to the assistance of REP Plant MGMT or to
    general surveillance of plant's exterior and protected area, as
    warranted by the situation.
    e. Observe exclusion area with CCTV and alert RESPN Team
    regarding location and nature of suspicious activity, such as:
    - Attempted movement by persons from the protected area
    to the outside or
    - Attempted hiding of items or passage of items to
    outside of perimeter fence.
    f. Monitor and report situation to Security Officer (SAS) and
    REP Plant MGMT; recommend additional security precautions as
    appropriate.
    g. When authorized by the Security Officer (SAS) or REP Plant
    MGMT, enter Local Police Net; report nature of situation and @@
    assistance at plant.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:
    * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that
    a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have
    occurred, such as:
    - A hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof
    - Damaged plant doors or windows,
    * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive
    contamination external to plant,
    THE CAS WILL:
    a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical
    evidence to the Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT and recommend
    additional security measures as appropriate.
    b. Obtain locations of radiological hazard areas from Security
    Officer (SAS) or REP Plant MGMT and keep security force elements
    informed of such areas as applicable.
    Enclosure 3
    Appendix F
    SAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
    1.0 PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the SAS. The
    context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the
    basic plan.
    2.0 SAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    The SAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in
    coordination with CAS and REP Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site
    Security Officer informed of CAS and SAS actions as appropriate to the
    situation.
    a. Monitor the on-going situation and be prepared to assume
    responsibilities of CAS as indicated by the situation.
    b. Alert and commit RESPN Team, as indicated by the situation,
    to reinforce CAS or REP Plant security, to monitor or assess onsite
    security incidents, or to deal with an adversary incursion until
    effective police arrival.
    c. Summon and brief LEA response force to deal with adversary
    incursions against REP Plant or potential adversaries that are onsite.
    d. Alert, assemble, and commit Off-Duty Guards as indicated by
    the situation to reinforce CAS or REP Plant security.
    e. Prevent adversary penetration of SAS area to protect
    surveillance, communications, and alarm systems.
    f. Maintain liaison with local police and other security
    forces, as indicated by the situation, to monitor and assess offsite
    civil disturbances or other suspicious activity and to obtain early
    warning of possible incursions against REP Plant.
    3.0 STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of Security Force Operations with LEA response
    force operations will be accomplished through the Security Officer to
    the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police coordinate
    overall LEA response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, disposition, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening
    civil disturbances exist, etc.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
    4.0 SAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:
    * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,
    * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or
    because of observed anomalies or other suspicious
    situations, or
    * Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT
    or other authority,
    THE SAS WILL:
    a. Report all information about the perceived threat without
    delay to the Security Officer and keep REP Plant MGMT informed as
    applicable.
    b. Contact local police and other sources as necessary to
    monitor the status of civil disturbances and pertinent offsite
    suspicious activity of concern to REP Plant security.
    c. Implement additional security surveillance of REP Plant and
    CAS as directed by the Security Officer, e.g.,
    * Brief On-Duty and Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team
    elements concerning the threat and readiness
    preparations,
    * Place Off-Duty Guard on standby alert, and
    * Reinforce the CAS, the RESPN Team, and the patrol
    security of REP Plant.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS:
    * Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration, such
    as:
    - Annunciation of the silent alarm from the CAS, or
    otherwise reported by the CAS,
    - Annunciation of plant alarms without followup
    information from the CAS,
    - Suspicious acts or noises reported in or near the
    plant or on site, or
    - Civil disturbance or other suspicious situation on
    site, or being directed at the site.
    THE SAS WILL:
    a. Marshall and dispatch the RESPN Team to investigate and
    report on the situation.
    b. As applicable, alert the CAS and the Security Officer about
    the situation and keep them informed of investigative results.
    c. Monitor and assess the situation to determine if there is
    danger of an attempted plant penetration.
    d. If an attempted plant penetration is perceived or appears to
    be imminent,
    * Commit the RESPN Team to stop or to delay the
    adversary, depending upon the relative situation of
    the adversary and the RESPN Team.
    * Request assistance of the LEA response force if it has
    not been requested already by the CAS or if the
    perceived adversary is still off site or is on site
    but not yet at the plant's exclusion area.
    * During its deployment to the site, keep the LEA
    response force informed of the site security and
    adversary situations and other information as directed
    by the Security Officer.
    * Alert, marshall, brief, and assist in the deployment
    of the Off-Duty Guards as directed by the Security
    Officer.
    * Alert and keep Site MGMT informed of the situation.
    * Prevent penetration of the SAS by the adversary.
    e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,
    monitor the situation and:
    * Brief and deploy the RESPN Team and the marshalled
    Off-Duty Guards as directed by the Security Officer to
    assist onsite LEA maintain surveillance of the plant's
    protected area and isolation of the plant from
    unauthorized traffic and persons.
    * Keep the Security Force, REP Plant MGMT, and Site MGMT
    informed of the situation to enhance effective
    coordination of the activities supporting negotiation
    efforts and preventing adversary escape with SNM.
    f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes,
    * Immediately report information on the escape situation
    to the LEA, i.e.,
    - Egress route and last seen direction of
    movement,
    - Transport description and license number(s),
    - Number of persons involved and descriptions,
    - Description of articles carried by adversary on
    departure, and
    - Location of adversary and cargo in the
    transport.
    * Request the LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit
    operations to apprehend the adversary for recovery of
    any missing SNM.
    g. Assist in conducting after-action interviews of the Security
    Force as directed by the Security Officer.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THE SAS:
    * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to
    sabotage the plant, e.g.,
    - Attempt is reported from CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the
    Security Officer,
    - Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm
    annunciates,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant, or
    - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or
    other safeguards degrading incident occurs,
    THE SAS WILL:
    a. Alert and dispatch RESPN Team if warranted by the situation
    to:
    * Investigate and report on alarm situations and take
    action as required to prevent an internal adversary's
    (1) escape with SNM or (2) sabotage of the plant.
    * Observe evacuations of the plant buildings for any
    suspicious activity (e.g., obvious security breaches,
    attempted hiding or passage of items in the protected
    area, attempted exit via protective fences, etc.) and
    report and investigate any such activity.
    b. Dispatch guard assistance when requested by REP Plant MGMT
    to assist in dealing with internal disturbances.
    c. Marshall Off-Duty Guards and request LEA assistance as
    directed by the Security Officer.
    d. Brief and deploy the security force as directed by the
    Security Officer to compensate for degraded plant safeguards capability.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS IS INFORMED OF:
    * Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected
    intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g.:
    - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, or the roof
    - Damaged plant doors or windows, or
    * Damage that results in radioactive contamination external to
    plant,
    THE SAS WILL:
    a. Coordinate with CAS, Security Officer, and REP Plant MGMT as
    necessary to obtain information on radiological hazard areas; keep guard
    force informed of such areas.
    b. Dispatch RESPN Team to inspect the plant area for damaged
    protective fences and buildings and to recommend security arrangements
    required to restore adequate protection; keep Security Officer and REP
    Plant MGMT informed of such information.
    c. Marshall and deploy Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team elements
    as directed by the Security Officer to secure damaged plant areas and to
    isolate hazardous radioactive areas.
    Enclosure 4
    Appendix F
    RESPN TEAM'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the RESPN Team. The
    context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the
    basic plan.
2. RESPN TEAM'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    The RESPN Team will accomplish general responsibilities listed
    below in coordination with CAS and SAS. SAS will keep the Site Security
    Officer informed of RESPN Team actions as appropriate to the situation.
    a. Be prepared to arm, to communicate, and to respond
    immediately when alerted and to summon LEA response force as dictated by
    the situation.
    b. Intercept, assess, report, and deal with perceived adversary
    incursions against REP Plant until effective LEA arrival in order to
    prevent theft or plant sabotage.
    c. Monitor and report on pertinent civil disturbances and other
    suspicious situations to assist in assessing their danger to REP Plant.
    d. Secure and protect damaged plant areas or plant areas with
    degraded safeguards capability, as directed by the Security Officer.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    * Deploy the RESPN Team to apprehend, stop, or delay the
    adversary, depending upon the adversary's relative
    strength and dispositions and the need for protective
    cover and concealment for the RESPN Team.
    * Conduct operations as necessary to apprehend, stop, or
    delay the adversary until the LEA response force
    arrives.
    * Keep the Security Officer (SAS) informed of the
    situation and request reinforcements as dictated by
    the situation.
    e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,
    accomplish deployments and security measures as directed by the Security
    Officer (SAS) to prevent adversary escape with SNM; continue to observe
    and report the situation.
    f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes,
    immediately notify the Security Officer (SAS) of the observed escape
    situation, i.e.,
    * Egress routes and last seen direction of movement,
    * Transport description and license number(s),
    * Number of persons involved and descriptions,
    * Description of articles carried on departure, and
    * Location of adversary and cargo in the transport.
    g. Accomplish deployments and security measures as directed by
    the Security Officer (SAS) to restore or maintain protection of the
    plant.
    h. Accomplish tasks in paragraph 4.3 below if plant damage or
    dispersed radioactivity exists, or if physical evidence is reported
    which suggests that a previously undetected intrusion might have
    occurred.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM IS INFORMED OF OR OBSERVES:
    * Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected
    intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g.,
    - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,
    - Damaged plant doors or windows, or
    - Damage that results in radioactive contamination
    external to plant,
    THE RESPN TEAM WILL:
    a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical
    evidence to the Security Officer (SAS) and provide additional security
    as directed.
    b. Isolate hazardous radioactive areas.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM:
    * Is alerted by the CAS or REP Plant MGMT of a possible
    internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, such
    as:
    - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal
    alarms annunciate,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant, or
    - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or
    other safeguards degrading incident occurs,
    THE RESPN TEAM WILL:
    a. Deploy to the scene as directed by the CAS or Security
    Officer and investigate situation.
    b. Report on-scene situation to CAS and Security Officer.
    c. Lock doors and reset alarm system in coordination with REP
    Plant MGMT.
    d. Provide additional security as directed by CAS and Security
    Officer.
    e. Apprehend individuals attempting sabotage of REP Plant or
    unauthorized removal of SNM from REP Plant.
    Enclosure 5
    Appendix F
    OFF-DUTY GUARDS' PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequencies normally accomplished by the Off-Duty
    Guards. The context and background perspective of these duties are
    presented in the basic plan.
2. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    The Off-Duty Guards will accomplish general responsibilities
    listed below in coordination with SAS:
    a. Be prepared to execute alert procedures and assemble when
    directed by SAS.
    b. Reinforce the CAS or REP Plant security as applicable.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening
    civil disturbances exist, etc.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
4. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS ARE PLACED ON ALERT STATUS
    BY THE SECURITY OFFICER (SAS):
    THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS WILL:
    a. Assemble at the designated point as soon as possible and be
    prepared to accomplish guard security functions.
    b. Accomplish and maintain security deployments and duties as
    directed by the Security Officer or SAS.
    Enclosure 6
    Appendix F
    SITE MANAGEMENT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Site MGMT. The
    context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the
    basic plan.
2. SITE MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    Site MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in
    coordination with Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT:
    a. Monitor on-going situation.
    b. Provide emergency supporting services.
    c. Execute site emergency plans as indicated by the situation.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site; threatening
    civil disturbances exist.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
    4.0 SITE MGM'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES:
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT RECEIVES OR LEARNS OF AN EXPLICIT
    THREAT AGAINST THE PLANT,
    THE SITE MGMT WILL:
    Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to
    the Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT IS INFORMED:
    * That a serious threat against the plant exists or
    * That an emergency evacuation of the plant occurs,
    THE SITE MGMT WILL:
    Be prepared to provide emergency supporting services when
    requested by REP Plant MGMT and to execute site emergency plans when
    required by the situation.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT SITE MGMT LEARNS THAT A PLANT PENETRATION IS IN
    PROGRESS OR IS PERCEIVED AS IMMINENT,
    THE SITE MGMT WILL:
    a. Establish and maintain liaison with REP Plant MGMT to keep
    appraised of the situation.
    b. Provide emergency supporting services and execute site
    emergency plans as warranted by the situation.
    c. If the plant is penetrated and held hostage, be prepared to
    accomplish REP Plant MGMT actions in the event REP Plant MGMT is
    unavailable due to hostage situation.
    Enclosure 7
    Appendix F
    REP PLANT MGMT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and listed
    below in coordination with Site MGMT, NRC, and local, county, and State
    police:
2. REP PLANT'S MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    REP Plant MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed
    below in coordination with Site MGMT, NRC, and local, county, and State
    police:
    a. Assess threats made against REP Plant to determine their
    seriousness.
    b. Increase security readiness as appropriate to prevent theft
    of SNM or sabotage at REP Plant whenever threatened adversary incursions
    are serious.
    c. Monitor and assess incursion situations and direct security
    and REP Plant operations as necessary to prevent theft of SNM or
    sabotage.
    d. Conduct extra SNM inventories and other MCA operations
    indicated by the situation to assess theft or diversion possibilities or
    to determine if SNM is missing.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and
    activities.
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening
    civil disturbances exist, etc.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
4. REP PLANT MGMT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,
    * Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or
    because of observed anomalies or other suspicious situations
    at the plant, or
    * Is informed that a serious threat exists by duly constituted
    authority,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Have the Security Officer arrange monitoring of the civil
    disturbance or suspicious situation to assess the extent of danger to
    the plant, as applicable.
    b. Assemble available information on threat and adversary.
    c. Report threat to NRC, to company headquarters, and to law
    enforcement agencies as applicable and request any pertinent information
    that may be available.
    d. Assess available information to determine if threat is
    serious; if threat is perceived serious or determined serious by duly
    constituted authority,
    - Report assessment to NRC, to company headquarters, and
    to Site MGMT.
    - Coordinate with company headquarters and Site MGMT as
    appropriate to inform local, county, and State law
    enforcement of threat and to request assistance.
    - Direct increased plant security appropriate to
    situation via Security Officer.
    - Monitor on-going situation and be prepared to take
    further actions as necessary.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Is requested by duly constituted authority to perform an
    item count inventory in relation to a threat posed
    elsewhere,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Direct the conduct of the item count inventory and
    b. Report results to NRC.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Receives a report from the Security Officer, CAS, or SAS or
    otherwise learns of an imminent or ongoing attempt by an
    adversary or civil disturbance to penetrate the plant,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Depending upon situation, direct evacuation of plant
    personnel from plant area or assemble personnel into the protection of
    central rooms in plant area.
    b. In coordination with Security Officer, continue monitoring
    and assessment of on-going situation; direct additional security
    measures as required by situation.
    c. Report situation to NRC.
    d. If plant is seized and held hostage,
    * Report situation to Security Officer, police
    authorities, and NRC as appropriate.
    * Establish communications with adversary and direct
    negotiations until police arrive.
    * As required by police situation, request NRC arrange
    Federal assistance from FBI to negotiate plant's
    release and adversary surrender.
    * Assist police and FBI; as applicable, negotiate with
    adversary.
    e. If adversary escapes,
    * As appropriate to situation, monitor and report escape
    situation to Security Officer and police authorities;
    request offsite apprehension.
    * Direct radiological survey of plant damage.
    * Coordinate with Security Officer to deploy guard force
    for protection of uncovered plant exclusion area.
    * Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM.
    * Conduct interviews of guards and plant employees to
    determine if SNM theft was observed.
    * Assemble and assess information to estimate
    quantity/type SNM stolen and radioactivity dispersed.
    * Report situation and status of SNM and dispersal to
    NRC.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to
    sabotage the plant, such as:
    - Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal
    alarms annuciate,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant, or
    - An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or
    other safeguards degrading incident occurs,
    * Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that
    a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might have
    occurred, such as,
    - Hole in perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,
    - Damaged plant doors or windows,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Coordinate with the Security Officer as necessary to
    determine the circumstances of the incident and the present status and
    activity of the security force; request law enforcement and immediate
    guard assistance as indicated by the situation.
    b. Assemble and assess available information on the incident to
    determine if it is associated with an attempted theft or sabotage.
    c. Direct additional security measures and plant actions as
    required by the situation, e.g.,
    - Restore safeguards and security for plant exclusion
    area, MAA, and VA,
    - Search Plant exclusion and contiguous areas for
    diverted SNM,
    - Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM, and
    - Assess circumstances of situation to assist law
    enforcement investigators to identify and apprehend
    adversary.
    d. As warranted, report situation and status of SNM and
    dispersal to NRC.
    4.5 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive
    contamination,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Assemble information and assess damage, security
    deficiencies, and radiological hazard.
    b. Commence radiological safety emergency plan procedures as
    applicable.
    c. Secure the plant and restore safeguards to MAA and exclusion
    areas.
    d. Establish priorities for temporary and permanent repairs to
    plant and security systems.
    e. Report situation to NRC.
    4.6 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:
    * Learns that material control and accounting records have
    been damaged, destroyed, altered or are missing, or
    * Is advised that the material control and accounting system
    indicates a possible theft of SNM,
    THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:
    a. Report situation to NRC.
    b. Assemble and assess information on damage, destruction, or
    discrepancies pertaining to MCA records.
    c. Reconstruct records if applicable.
    d. Direct audit and inventory as necessary to locate possible
    erroneous data from previous inventory actions.
    e. Resolve differences between inventory data and record data.
    f. If SNM is unaccounted for, report type and quantity missing
    to NRC.
    Enclosure 8
    Appendix F
    ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and
    contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the ADMIN, MAA, and
    BLDG 7 personnel. The context and background perspective of these
    duties are presented in the basic plan.
2. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
    ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 personnel will accomplish general
    responsibilities listed below in coordination with REP Plant MGMT.
    a. Upon receiving alert of a possible adversary incursion,
    immediately lock doors to MAA and VA, as applicable, to protect against
    possible SNM theft or sabotage, and be prepared to assemble or to
    evacuate as directed by REP Plant MGMT.
    b. Observe for and report information on adversary activities
    or suspicious events to REP Plant MGMT to assist in assessment of the
    on-going situation, and to detect attempts to steal or divert SNM or to
    sabotage.
    d. Assist in conducting SNM inventories and other operations as
    directed by REP Plant MGMT to assess possibilities of theft or to
    determine if SNM is missing.
    d. Report damaged or unprotected areas in REP Plant buildings,
    and provide protection to restore security as directed by REP Plant
    MGMT.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall repsonse actions of REP
    Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.
    b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to
    assume control of security force response operations as soon as
    practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.
    c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by
    the Security Officer.
    d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions
    directed at site locations other than the REP Plant's protected area
    until control is assumed by the Security Officer.
    e. Coordination of security force operations with police
    response force operations will be accomplished through the Security
    Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red Town Police
    coordinate overall police response operations.
    f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to
    serve as the net base station for control of the net.
    g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate
    in the Site Radio Comm Net from receipt of a contingency alert until the
    Security Officer terminates the alert.
    h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and
    pass information to each other by the fastest available means, i.e.,
    radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger, voice.
    i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes
    of operational coordination by observing and reporting on:
    * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and
    activities and
    * Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the
    adversary situation.
    j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to
    pass unless specifically authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the
    Security Officer whenever:
    * An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.
    * A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g.,
    armed persons or known criminals on site, threatening
    civil disturbances exist, etc.
    * An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived
    possibility of an internal theft attempt exists.
    * An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in
    progress, or exists.
4. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:
    * Receive or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,
    * Are informed by the SAS or Security Officer that a civil
    disturbance or other suspicious situation might constitute a
    threat against the plant, or
    * Learn from the Security Officer or other authority that a
    serious threat actually exists against the plant,
    THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:
    a. Report to REP Plant MGMT and Security Officer without delay
    all threat information or knowledge of civil disturbances and other
    suspicious events.
    b. Perform additional security surveillance of plant as
    directed by REP Plant MGMT.
    c. Be prepared to assist in securing REP Plant MAA, vital
    areas, and building when alerted.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:
    * Observe or are informed that a plant penetration is in
    progress or is perceived imminent,
    THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:
    a. When alerted, immediately lock alarmed doors that might
    happen to be open.
    b. Execute evaucation or assembly as directed by REP Plant
    MGMT.
    c. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,
    * Keep alarmed doors locked as applicable.
    * Evacuate REP Plant employees as directed by REP Plant
    MGMT.
    * Communicate with adversary only as directed by REP
    Plant MGMT.
    d. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes,
    * Report to REP Plant MGMT any observed plant damage or
    likely radiological hazards caused by the adversary.
    * Execute pertinent radiological emergency plans as
    directed by REP Plant MGMT.
    * Secure MAA and VA in accordance with REP Plant
    procedures.
    * Report any observed SNM theft by adversary to REP
    Plant MGMT.
    * Assist in conduct of SNM inventory in accordance with
    REP Plant procedure.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:
    * Learn of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to
    sabotage the plant, e.g.,
    - Material control and accounting records are damaged,
    destroyed, altered, missing or the accounting and
    control system indicates a possible theft,
    - CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the Security Officer reports,
    - Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm
    annunciates,
    - An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance
    (fight, irrational behavior, etc.) occurs in the
    plant,
    - An emergency power outage, communication outage, or
    other safeguards degrading incident occurs,
    * Learn of physical evidence suggesting that a previously
    undetected intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g.,
    - Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof or
    - Damaged plant doors or windows,
    THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:
    a. As applicable, report to REP Plant MGMT any observed
    security breaches or suspicious activity, particularly regarding
    attempts to hide items or to pass items outside the perimeter fence.
    b. Assist in the assessment of the situation and restoration of
    safeguards and services as directed by REP Plant MGMT.
    c. Assist in search of REP Plant area for diverted SNM and for
    evidence of sabotage as directed by REP Plant MGMT.
    d. Assist accomplishment of inventory actions as directed by
    REP Plant MGMT.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF:
    * Damage that results in radioactive contamination,
    THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:
    a. Execute pertinent radiological safety emergency plans.
    b. Post watchman as required to secure MAA and VA and
    coordinate with Security Officer to obtain desired guard support.
    c. Report damage and physical security deficiencies to REP
    Plant MGMT.
    Enclosure 9
    Appendix F
    LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE
    This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task
    sequences that are requested of the pertinent LEA in the planned
    contingency situations. The context and background perspective of these
    actions are presented in the basic plan.
2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS
    The LEA have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order
    within their respective jurisdictional areas. With their available
    resources they endeavor to prevent illegal activities, solve crimes, and
    apprehend law breakers. Within the context of their law enforcement
    responsibilities, applicable LEA, in the near vicinity of NRC licensed
    facilities requiring Part 73 physical protection, have been requested to
    perform the functions listed below in response to contingency
    situations.
    a. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious
    situation.
    b. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary
    actions against nuclear facilities within their jurisdiction.
    c. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) as
    required by the situation.
3. STANDARD PROCEDURES
    Red Town Police have been requested to:
    a. Be prepared to respond as soon as possible to a request for
    law enforcement assistance from the plant.
    b. Marshall and coordinate assistance from other law
    enforcement jurisdictions as required to deal with unlawful incursions
    against the plant.
    c. Report any available information to the REP Plant MGMT, NRC,
    and the FBI that is indicative of possible danger to the plant or
    personnel.
    d. Coordinate law enforcement plans and response operations
    with the Security Officer.
4. LEA'S TASK SEQUENCES
    4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:
    * An explicit threat against the plant,
    * A civil disturbance or other suspicious situation that might
    constitute a threat against the plant, or
    * A serious threat that is believed to exist against the
    plant,
    THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:
    a. Provide any available information relative to the situation.
    b. Assist REP Plant MGMT in assessment of the threat as
    requested.
    4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA:
    * Is advised of an event that requires temporary changes in
    LEA response plans, e.g.,
    - Blocked LLEA route to site,
    - Communication outages,
    THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:
    a. Coordinate with the Security Officer.
    b. Modify their plans for assistance as appropriate.
    4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:
    * A plant penetration that is in progress or is perceived as
    imminent,
    THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:
    a. Request additional police assistance as warranted by the
    situation.
    b. Assemble a police force without delay at the plant site.
    c. Coordinate with the Security Officer to obtain situation
    information needed for effective direction of LEA resource operations.
    d. Establish offsite road blocks as required by situation.
    e. Execute police plans to apprehend adversaries.
    f. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,
    * Execute police plans to negotiate release of plant and
    hostages and the surrender of the adversary.
    * Establish and maintain road blocks on site and off
    site and other deployments as required to ensure
    capture of adversary if an escape is attempted.
    g. If escape from plant is underway,
    * Pursue and apprehend adversaries in coordination with
    State and county police authorities.
    * Assist FBI investigation to recover any stolen SNM.
    4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:
    * Sabotage that has resulted in dispersal of radioactivity,
    THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:
    Assist in isolation of radiological hazards area by providing
    traffic and crowd control as necessary.
    52